Denver Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 2

Article 7

1940

Vol. 17, no. 2: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
17 Dicta (1940).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

I

VOLUME

17

1940

f

The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association
1940

Printed in U. S. A.

THE BRADFORD-ROBINSON PRINTING CO.
Denver, Colorado

The Denuer Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association

Vol. XVII

FEBRUARY, 1940

No. 2
PAGE

Practice Before the National Labor Relations Board -----

29

By Aaron W. Warner

Estates of Insane Veterans and War Orphans

----

-

38

By Dee H. Beer

Meeting of House of Delegates of American Bar Association
---------------------------------------45
Colorado Junior Bar Conference Plans Regional Meetings 47
Current Events of Bench and Bar

-------------------

48

Published monthly by the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations and devoted to
the interests thereof.
Address all communications concerning:
Editorial Matters of the Denver Bar Association, to Dicta, Roy 0. Samson, Editor-inChief, 1020 University Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Editorial Matters of the Colorado Bar Association, to Win. Hedges Robinson, Jr., 619
Midland Savings Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Advertising, to Dicta, Sydney H. Grossman, Business Manager. 617 Symes Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Subscriptions to Dicta, James A. Woods, Secretary Denver Bar Association, 930-35
1st National Bank Bldg., Denver, Colo.

20 cents a copy

$1.75 a year

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES
of the

DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
1939-1940
SARTHUR HENRY
President- ...
1st Vice-President--------------------- ----B. C. HILLIARD, JR.
Louis A. HELLERSTEIN
2nd Vice-President --------------------Secretary-Treasurer

---------------- JAMES A. WOODS

Business Office, 930-35 First National Bank Building, Phone MAin 6104
TRUSTEES
S. ARTHUR HENRY, Ex-Officio
PERCY S. MORRIS, to July 1, 1941
JOHN E. GORSUCH, to July 1, 1940
A. K. BARNES, to July 1, 1942
FRANK N. BANCROFT, to July 1, 1940
FRANK L. FETZER, to July 1, 1942
DUDLEY W. STRICKLAND, to July 1, 1941

COMMITTEES OF DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
Grievance
Benjamin E. Sweet. Chairman
Marmaduke Holt
Milton J. Keegan
Jacob L. Sherman
Nicholas Lakusta

Unlawful Practice
John L. Zanoni, Chairman
F. P. Cranston
Gail L. Ireland
Finlay M. Robinson
Charles C. Sackmann

Legislative
Pierpont Fuller, Jr., Chairman
John R. Coen
Stephen H. Hart
Samuel M. January
Henry S. Sherman

Meetings and Entertainment
Edward L. Wood. Chairman
Joseph G. Hodges
Josiah G. Holland
Edward C. King
Harry S. Silverstein, Jr.

Judiciary
Lewis A. Dick, Chairman
John P. Akolt
Robert E. More
Albert L. Vogl
Edwin J. Wittelshofer

Membership
Darwin D. Coit, Chairman
Wayne Bannister
R. R. Irwin
Ira Rothgerber, Jr.
Charles W. Sheldon, Jr.

DICTA
ROY 0. SAMSON. Editor in Chief
Auociate Editors
HORACE N. HAWKINS, JR.
WM. HEDGES ROBINSON, JR.
PERCY S. MORRIS
C. CLYDE BARKER
GEORGE P. WINTERS
Louis E. GELT
Business Manager. SYDNEY H. GROSSMAN

Practice Before the
National Labor
Relations Board
BY AARON W. WARNER*
1. Introduction-Purposes and Background of the Act
The present law of labor relations traces back to a shortage of labor
during the period of the Black Death in England. The enormous bargaining power created in the individual worker by the labor scarcity
became a menace to the national economy, and resulted in drastic legislation. In 14th century England it became a crime and a civil offense
for a worker to combine with his fellows to secure higher wages or improved working conditions.
It has taken almost six centuries for labor to win recognition of its
right to organize. As late as 1806, a court in Philadelphia, in the celebrated PhiladelphiaCorduainer'sCase, applied the accepted English doctrine that a combination of employees to raise their wages was a criminal
conspiracy. Even after the complete suppression of unions and union
activity was superseded by an attitude of judicial tolerance, there still
remained a number of hang-over common law doctrines, including the
doctrines of restraint of trade and interference with contract, which,
together with the effective use of the labor injunction, were applied to
excess in the stifling of union activity. As in many other fields of thought
where new concepts evolve slowly from the old-so slowly that the old
and the new have time to exist side by side in irreconcilable contradiction
-a
number of paradoxes became discernible in the field of labor law.
For example, it became possible for workers, who were engaged in the
exercise of their legal rights to organize, to find themselves locked out
and blacklisted. by anti-union employers who, in so doing, were also
acting within the scope of the law.
Needless to say, the economic situation of the worker has changed
considerably since the Black Death. In contrast with the importance of
the bargaining power of the individual worker during the infancy of the
industrial era, the voice of the unorganized worker today is not to be
heard above the whir of the machinery. In 1898, an industrial commission appointed by the President of the United States to investigate the
causes of strikes and industrial unrest in the various states, reported that
"it is readily perceived that the position of a single workman, face to
face with one of our great modern combinations, such as the United
States Steel Corporation, is in a position of very great weakness. * * *
By the organization of labor and by no other means, it is possible to
* Regional Director.
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introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry."
In 1912, a commission was appointed by President Wilson to investigate the industrial unrest of the period and to inquire into its causes.
The commission found that in large-scale industry throughout the country there was a general denial by employers of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively, and concluded that the denial of the
right and opportunity by workers to form effective organizations was
one of the main causes of industrial conflict. It reported that the most
violent industrial disputes of the past quarter century "have been revolutions against industrial oppression, and not merely strikes for the improvement of working conditions." The commission went on to report
that where men are well organized, and the power of employers and
employees is fairly well balanced, agreements are nearly always reached
by negotiations, and it recommended that every means should be used to
extend and strengthen organization throughout the entire industrial field.
There have been many other official inquiries of this nature, resulting in an almost unanimous verdict that efforts by employers to suppress
the efforts of employees to organize are bound ultimately to fail and to
provoke, meanwhile, the bitterest industrial unrest.
One of the main reasons for the existing protection afforded workers who seek to organize, and the restraints upon employers who would
interfere with such activities is this demonstrated fact that in the past
industrial warfare, so costly and troublesome to the nation, has been
caused chiefly by employer repression of workers' attempts at self-organization. For many years the federal government has experimented with
devices designed to bring peace to industry. The National War Labor
Board, set up during the World War, was such an experiment. Efforts to
deal with labor relations on the railroads have had a long history, culminating in the passage of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, which is based
on the assumption that the basis for stable, amicable labor relations is the
periodic negotiation of collective agreements between employers and
strong unions representing the employees. The National Mediation
Board, created to administer the Railway Labor Act, has had notable
success in averting strikes in the railroad industry. In its first annual
report, issued in 1935, the board stated: "The absence of strikes in the
railroad industry * * * is to be explained primarily not by the mediation machinery of the Railway Labor Ac, but by the existence of * * *
collective labor contracts. For, while they are in existence, these contracts provide orderly, legal processes of settling all labor disputes as a
substitute for strikes and industrial warfare."
In 1933, Congress undertook, in Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, to apply to employment relations generally the
tried principles of the Railway Labor Act.

DICTA

31

The National Labor Relations Act was passed on July 5, 1935,
creating the present National Labor Relations Board. The House Committee on labor described the measure as "merely an amplification and
further clarification of the principles enacted into law by the Railway
Labor Act and by Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
with the addition of enforcement machinery of a-familiar pattern." It
should be made clear at the outset that the Act was not designed to
remove all causes of labor disputes nor was the. board intended to regulate and supervise wages, hours or working conditions. The essential
purpose of Congress was to promote industrial peace by giving definite
legal status to the procedure of collective bargaining. Since one of the
most fertile sources of industrial discontent had been the refusal by employers to recognize and negotiate with employee representatives, it
seemed plausible that the removal of this evil would result in a more
harmonious relationship.
The Act provides, in essence, for only three things. One is the
liberty of working people to join or form unions if they wish to, free
from interference by their employers. The second is the duty of employers to bargain collectively with the representatives selected by a
majority of their employees. The third is the duty of the board to
ascertain by an election or otherwise what unions, if any, a majority
of the employees in a proper unit desire to represent them. These, it
will be recognized, are the basic requirements for collective bargaining.
Without freedom from-employer interference and without the opportunity to organize into self-directed and self-financed bargaining agencies, the right to organize is a sham. Nor has anything been accomplished
if employers assume an attitude of mere tolerance toward employee
organization without an accompanying willingness to bargain. Collective bargaining implies, in addition to recognition, an acceptance of an
obligation to negotiate in good faith, with the purpose of entering into
a binding agreement when negotiations are successful.
In setting up the National Labor Relations Board, Congress made
use of the same device which it had used to regulate railroads, communications, trade practices and other types of industry which presented special problems. The board was given powers to investigate and adjudicate
cases where employers, by failing to accord employees their rights under
the Act, have committed unfair labor practices in which the national
government has an interest by reason of the effect of those practices upon
interstate commerce.

2. Practice Before the Board
Cases brought before the National Labor Relations Board fall into
two categories-those which have to do with unfair labor practices
under the Act, and those having to do with questions concerning the
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representation of employees. The Act itself enumerates the prohibited
practices, and empowers the board, subject to court review, to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. The unfair labor practices described and forbidden by the Act
may be summarized as follows:
1. Employers are prohibited from interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to form, join or assist
labor organizations or to engage in labor activities.
2. It is an unfair practice for an employer to dominate or interfere
with, or contribute support to, any labor organization.
3. It is an unfair practice for an employer to discriminate against
an employee in order to encourage or discourage his membership in a
labor organization.
4. It is an unfair practice for an employer to discriminate against
an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act.
5. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of a majority of his employees
in a proper unit.
If it is found that an unfair labor practice has been committed, the
board is empowered to order the offending employer to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of the Act. In no sense is the remedy afforded by
the Act punitive in nature. The statute is remedial. In protecting the
fundamental liberty of the working man, Congress selected the administrative process, rather than that of the criminal trial, as the means of
enforcement. The employer who has acted in violation of the statute
does not pay a heavy fine and go to jail; instead he notiies his employees
that he will cease and desist from interfering with their guaranteed rights,
reinstates those employees whom he has illegally fired because of their
union activities, and agrees to bargain collectively with the duly designated representatives of a majority of his employees if he has refused to
do so in contravention of the Act.
The board's procedure is set forth in the Act, and is amplified by
the rules and regulations. The procedure is simple and direct, and is
intended to provide an orderly and expeditious method of administering
justice. The work of the board is of necessity decentralized through
regional offices. Each region is under a Regional Director, who has a
legal staff and field examiners. The latter aid in the investigation and
adjournment of cases, working directly under the Regional Director.
The board itself does not initiate a case. Its attention is first drawn
to an alleged violation of the statute by a sworn charge filed in a Regional
Office by an employee or a group of employees, or by a labor organiza-
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tion. When such a charge is filed, it is investigated by agents of the board
attached to the particular Regional Office with which the charge is filed.
This investigation is not perfunctory; it involves careful study of the
matter in conference with the persons filing the charge and with the
employer. The objective is to obtain all the pertinent facts from the
parties. Upon the basis of this investigation about 16 per cent of all
charges are dismissed as without merit or as not within the board's jurisdiction. About 26 per cent in addition are withdrawn by the charging
party. These withdrawals usually result from advice by the Regional
Office that the charges are without merit or not within the board's jurisdiction. The very large total of about 42 per cent of all cases are thus
disposed of favorably to the employer in their preliminary stages by
dismissal or withdrawal before issuance of a complaint. About 52 per
cent additional are settled in this preliminary stage; that is, the matter
is adjusted between the board and the employer in a manner satisfactory
to both. These three methods of disposition; that is, dismissals, withdrawals, or adjustments, account for 94 per cent of all cases thus far
closed, and the board has closed some 20,000 cases. This leaves only
about 6 per cent of the cases brought to the board in which the board,
as a result of the preliminary investigation, considers formal proceedings
warranted. These are the cases prepared and tried. The preparation is
done in the Regional Office, except that an occasional case is spcially
assigned to an attorney attached to the Washington staff.
Up to this point, the proceedings have been informal. In the small
percentage of cases which require formal action, a "complaint" is issued
by the Regional Director, for the board. The complaint details the
respects in which it is alleged the employer has violated the law, and the
facts on which jurisdiction is claimed under the commerce power. The
person complained of, the employer, is expressly granted the right to file
an answer setting forth all defenses to the complaint, and to appear in
person or otherwise and to give testimony at the time and place fixed for
the hearing in the complaint. The hearing is conducted by a Trial Examiner designated by the board. The testimony taken at the hearing on
the complaint and answer is required by the Act to be reduced to writing,
so that a permanent record is made of the testimony. Upon conclusion
of the hearing, the trial examiner makes his intermediate report, containing findings of fact and recommendations as to the appropriate order
that should be made by the board. This report is served upon the parties, who are permitted to file exceptions. The parties may also have
oral argument before the board, and may file briefs. The board at Washington then reconsiders the entire record and makes its own findings and
order. It may set aside the hearing and order a new one, it may require
additional testimony to be taken, or, if it believes the hearing has been
adequate, it may proceed to decide the case on the merits.
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There has been some confusion as to the kind of evidence received
by the board at its hearings. It is true that the board, as in the case
of other administrative agencies, is not required under the Act to follow
the orthodox rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity.
However, the evidence received must be material and competent. In the
Consolidated.Edison case [305 U. S. 197 (1938) 1 the U. S. Supreme
Court laid down the following standard: "The statute provides that
'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to
free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227 U. S.
88, 93; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274,
288; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442.
But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence."
The board has no power to enforce its decisions and orders, except
by petition to the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals. The right is
also reserved to the employer to petition the Circuit Court to set aside
the order of the Board. Upon the filing of its petition, the Poard is
required to certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire record
in the proceeding, including the pleadings, testimony, and the findings
and order. The court then gives notice to all parties of the filing of the
petition for enforcement and the filing of the record. At this point the
case becomes a case within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals. After the case is briefed and argued, the Circuit Court has power
to make a decree enforcing, modifying or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the board. The Circuit Court is not limited to a mere
review of the findings made on the evidence which the board permitted
to be taken. It has the power to order that additional evidence be taken
by the board for transmittal to the court in addition to its power to set
aside the board's order for any procedural error or material exclusion of
evidence.
The procedure of the board has been considered by the courts in
many cases and has invariably been accorded judicial favor. In the Jones
U Laughlin case [301 U. S. 1 (1937) ], Chief Justice Hughes spoke of
the board's procedure as follows: "The procedural provisions of the Act
are assailed. But these provisions, as we construe them, do not offend
against the constitutional requirements governing the creation and action
of administrative bodies. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville
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& Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 9 1. The Act establishes standards
to which the board must conform. There must be complaint, notice,
and hearings. The board must receive evidence and make findings. The
findings as to the facts are to be conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The order of the board is subject to review by the designated
court, and only when sustained by the court may the order be enforced.
Upon that review all questions of the jurisdiction of the board and the
regularity of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right or statutory authority, are open to examination by the court. We construe
the procedural provisions as affording adequate opportunity to secure
judicial protection against arbitrary action in accordance with the wellsettled rules applicable to administrative agencies set up by Congress to
aid in the enforcement of valid legislation."
We have still to consider those cases which have to do with questions concerning the representation of employees. These proceedings are
inquiries into the question of whether or ,not a majority of the employees
in an appropriate collective bargaining unit have designated or selected
bargaining representatives. Such proceedings arise on the filing of a petition, as distinct from a charge. Here again the board is authorized to
conduct an investigation and in connection therewith to hold a hearing.
However, the issues in a representation proceeding are quite different from
those in the complaint proceeding. For one thing, the employer is not
charged with any violation of the Act. The conflicting claims of the
parties relate only to the question of appropriate unit and the collective
bargaining majority. The function of the board's attorney in these
cases is to aid both sides in placing upon the record sufficient information
bearing on these questions to enable the board to reach an intelligent
decision on the record. If the proof as to the designation by a majority
is left in doubt on the record made at the hearing, the board may direct
that the question concerning representation be resolved by an election by
secret ballot held under its supervision and control. The board has held
more than 2,300 elections, in which close to a million valid votes have
been cast.
In representation cases, the board makes no final order against anyone. It determines the appropriate unit, and states whether or not the
petitioning union has or has not a majority in that unit. If there is no
majority in the unit, the petition is dismissed. If there is a majority, a
certification to that effect is made. Such a certification is merely a certification of fact, which neither increases ,nor decreases the rights or obligations of the parties. As a practical matter, it removes from the scope of
conflict one of the issues which may give rise to an industrial dispute.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient time for any attempt at a thorough analysis or evaluation of the board's work. I will therefore refer
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briefly, in closing to Senator Wagner's recent report to the Committee on
Education and Labor of the United States Senate. The Senator pointed
out that in 1938, the first full year of operation of the National Labor
Relations Board under the Supreme Court's mandate, there were only
about half as many strikes, one-third as many workers involved, and less
than one-third as much working time lost, as in the year 1937. For the
first time in a period of eight successive years there was a decisive turning
back from the rising number of conflicts. There were fewer workers
involved in strikes during 1938 than in any year since 1932, and workers
lost less time through strikes in 1938 than in any year since 1931. All
during 1936 and through March, 1937, there were many more strikes
called than cases filed with the board. When the Supreme Court upheld
the law in April, 1937, the trend was immediately reversed, and the
number of new board cases each month has averaged 3 /2 times the number of strikes, while the number of workers involved in board cases since
May, 1937, has been many times that involved in strikes. Equally significant is the history of the sit-down strikes which increased in number
to the peak figure of 170 in the month of March, 1937, and then declined
to the point of relative obscurity. It is on the strength of facts such as
these that Senator Wagner told the Senate committee that "The National
Labor Relations Act has thus played a notable, constructive role in our
national life. To millions of workers it has brought a better understanding of their employer's problems, and the material and spiritual
value of participating in a free organization of their fellows for mutual
aid and protection. To most employers who have given the principles
of the Act a fair trial, it has brought labor peace, and beyond that, a
more human relationship with workers based on the mutual respect and
understanding that grows out of free bargaining between free men.
These employers-and they now represent the overwhelming majority
-are among the chief beneficiaries of the Labor Act."

NEW BOOKS AT LAW LIBRARY
Miss Secrest, Librarian, advises that the following books have
been received at the library in the City and County Building, namely:
Quieting Title in Colorado, by Williams, 1939.
Wills, Hornbook Series, by Atkinson, 1937.
Partnership, Crane on- 1938.
Real Property, Thompson on-1939.
Fair Trade Acts, Weigele on-1938.
Criminal Evidence, Underhill on-1935.
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NEW OFFICERS ELECTED BY THIRTEENTH
JUDICIAL ASSOCIATION
Meeting at Fort Morgan, the Fourteenth Judicial District Bar Association selected Sherman E. Walrod of Holyoke as its president, and
Charles Kreager of Sterling as its secretary-treasurer. Governor Ralph
Carr and Justice Norris C. Bakke of the Supreme Court addressed the
association.
Following the meeting, a banquet was held at the Fort Morgan
Country Club. Mr. William R. Kelly of Greeley, president of the State
Bar, and M. E. H. Smith of Greeley, president of the Weld County Bar
Association, were present at the meeting.

Estates of Insane
Veterans and
War Orphans
BY DEE H. BEER*
It was generally observed during the earlier years following the
World War that in far too many cases the benefits paid through the
hands of conservators for insane veterans or guardians for war orphans
were being dissipated, embezzled, applied to improper purposes, or lost
through illegal investments. The various state courts would not have
permitted such abuse and neglect had they known the facts, but there
existed no appropriate machinery through which adequate inquiries could
be made by the courts. Pyramiding of the public sentiment against this
situation resulted in congressional action during the year 1926 in the
form of an amendment to the World War Veterans Act (Section 21),
which vested in the Director of the United States Veterans' Bureau, now
the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, authority to inquire into such
cases of neglect, to supervise the administration of the estates of beneficiaries under legal disability in cooperation with state courts and to bring
to the attention of the proper court all such cases of neglect, embezzlement or mal-administration. From time to time Congress has amended
this original statute with a view of extending and broadening the authority of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, and very helpful legislation
has also been enacted by the various state legislatures. These state and
federal statutes have placed certain duties and responsibilities upon the
Veterans' Adminsitration which are being performed under the direction
of the Solicitor of the Veterans' Administration, whose offices are in
Washington, D. C. The present solicitor, Mr. E. E. Odom, is a former
Colorado resident and a member of the Colorado bar.
In each state there has been established a field office for the purpose
of carrying out this program of estate supervision over all estates into
which Veterans' Administration funds are paid for the use of beneficiaries. We now have the estates of 85,000 beneficiaries suffering from
legal disability under our program of informal supervision; 1,022 of
this number are being administered by courts of the state of Colorado.
The total assets of these estates approximate the figure of $200,000,000,
of which Colorado estates total approximately $2,000,000.
*Chief Attorney Colorado Regional Office Veterans' Administration.
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In carrying forwara this program of supervision it is the primary
objective of attorneys in the field offices to solicit and acquire of our probate judges a sympathetic understanding of our program, and their permissive cooperation in allowing us to work between the estate representative and the court, for the purpose of seeing that the personal welfare
of the various beneficiaries is first adequately provided for and that there
then be conserved such portion of their moneys as may be found reasonable and equitable in the individual case. To accomplish these purposes
we ask but one thing-a strict observance of applicable Colorado and
protective federal statutes. There is no state in which a greater degree
of cooperation has been extended by probate courts than has been extended through the probate judges of the state of Colorado.
To attorneys practicing in this state we also owe a word of thanks
since we have to date, had no direct appellate court attack upon any portion of our program of supervision. Numerous appellate court attacks
have been made through the courts of sister states. Between the date on
which the World War Veterans' Act was first amended, in 1926, granting the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs authority to intervene and the
date upon which the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act (Art. 5,
Chapter 150, C. S. A., '35) was enacted by the various state legislatures, repeated attacks on the theory that the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs had no proper standing and could not be recognized as a party in
interest under the various estate statutes so as to permit the entrance of
his appearance with a view of bringing about desired corrective action.
The courts uniformly rejected this theory on the ground that the donor
of a gratuity had such an interest in its use as justifying the recognition
of the administrator as a party in interest for the purpose of following
the administration of estate assets so derived.
The Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act is almost identical in the
various states. There have been appellate court proceedings in other
states effecting practically every important section of the Act, but these
attacks have, on the whole, been most unsuccessful. The courts have
leaned towards a liberal construction with a view of assisting in the protection of the rights of these disabled veterans and minor orphans.
From a study of this Act it will be readily appreciated the state
legislature has most materially assisted the Veterans Administration in
carrying out the program of informal supervision, since the statute grants
a recognition of the right of the administrator to appear before the state
courts, enabling us to follow every phase of the estate administration.
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A study of the history of federal pension legislation will disclose
an early desire on the part of the Congress to enact protective statutes.
The authority of the Congress to enact legislation placing a protective
cloak around gratuity benefits was perhaps first considered in the case of
United States vs. Hall, 98 U. S. 343:
"The United States, as the donor of pensions, may
through the legislative department of the government, annex
such conditions to the donations as they see fit, to insure its
transmission unimpaired to the beneficiary."
Such a protective statute was incorporated in the World War Veterans Act as relating to the payment of gratuities for World War veterans. This proviso as it appears in Section 22 of the World War Veterans Act and in Section 454, Title 38, U. S. C. A., was originally
phrased as follows:
"That the compensation, insurance and maintenance and
support allowance payable under Part II, III, and IV, respectively, shall not be assignable; shall not be subject to the
claims of creditors of any person to whom an award is made
under Parts II, III, and IV; and shall be exempt from all
taxation."
The courts, generally speaking, were disposed to construe this statute liberally in favor of disabled soldiers. Kansas, in the case of State
us. Board of Commissioners of Shawnee County, 294 Pac. 915, rendered a decision in 1931 containing a very technical construction of the
words as employed in the statute. This court held that the word "payable" as employed in the statute could not be construed as extending
exemption protection beyond the date of delivery.
The state courts considered the Kansas decision a stumbling block
but still leaned toward a construction in favor of the insane veteran or
orphan child, as is shown in the case of Estate of Angelo Ferarazza, 28
In this case the California court relied upon
Pac. (2d) 670 (1934).
an old state pension statute, which statute has been enacted in most of
our state legislatures with little variation in phraseology. The California statute:
"*

* * all money received by any person, a resident of

the state, as a pension from the United States government
* * * whether the same shall be in the actual possession of

such pensioner, or deposited, loaned, or invested by him."
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The court held that, even conceding the strict construction as had
been placed on the statute by the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas,

this state statute served to fill the gap in protecting pension funds from
the claims of creditors following their delivery into the hands of an
estate representative.
A similar statute was enacted by the Colorado legislature of 1887
a,nd now appears in Section 17, Chapter 193, C. S. A. '35. Appellate
court decisions fail to disclose that this statute has been employed as a
matter of defense on a claimed exemption, and in passing it might be of
interest to note that this Colorado exemption statute was materially
strengthened by the following proviso, enacted in 1915, which now appears in Section 160, Chapter 176, C. S. A. '35, to-wit:
"Provided, that the real or personal estate of any mental
incompetent, which is or may be exempt by law from execution, shall not be sold for the payment of his debts."
The year following the California decision the federal exemption
statute was amended by the Congress with a view of meeting objections
as had been raised through the decisions of the various state courts and
particularly with a view of correcting the defect which resulted in the loss
of the Kansas case. The statute as last amended on August 12, 1935,
now reads:
"Payments of benefits due or to become due shall not be
assignable, and such payments made to or on account of a
beneficiary under any of the laws relating to veterans shall be
exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to
attachment, levy or seizure by or under any legal or equitable
process whatsoever either before or after receipt by the beneficiary. Such provision shall not attach to the claims of the
United States arising under such laws nor shall the exemption
herein contained as to taxation extend to any property purchased in part or wholly out of such payments."
Through this enactment the Congress in effect followed the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Trotter vs.
Tennessee, 290 U. S. 354, and incorporated in the amended statute a
specific proviso to the effect that the taxation exemption should not
extend to any property purchased in part or wholly out of such gratuity
payments. This modification, excluding the theory of taxation exemption as to property purchased with the funds following delivery, per-
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haps had some material effect upon estates administered in a number of
other states where investments are authorized in real property.
In 1936 the statute as revised reached the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Lawrence vs. Shaw, 300 U. S. 245. This case, appealed from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, involved a question
of whether the exemption as to taxation extended to bank deposits
made by a guardian for the estate of an insane veteran. The United
States Supreme Court held that the deposits in question could not be
recognized as investments within the meaning of the decision in the case
of Trotter vs. Tennessee and that the exemption on taxation as provided
for in the amended statute would extend so as to protect such estate
deposits from taxation.
In the last state legislature a bill was enacted containing the following proviso:
"It shall be lawful for (C) an executor, administrator,
guardian or conservator, trustee, or other fiduciary, to invest
the funds in their custody or possession eligible for investment in such securities as may be now or hereafter authorized
by law, and it shall be lawful to deposit such funds so eligible
for investment in any state or national bank in Colorado
which is, at the time the deposit is made, a member of the federal deposit insurance corporation."
This is, no doubt, a needed and useful statute, but, if it is ultimately construed so as to recognize deposits made under its authority as
investments, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Lawrence vs. Shaw may have some material bearing upon the future
administration of our Colorado statutes. Barring this possible eventuality, and with due consideration being given the investments as are now
authorized by statute in this state, it appears possible that the federal
exemption statute, as amended, provides ample protection to the assets
of the estates which are being administered through Colorado courts.
It might be of interest to invite attention to the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Page! vs. Pagel, 291 U. S.
473 (1934). In this case insurance moneys were paid into the estate of
the deceased soldier. A number of creditors claims were filed in the
estate and the heirs pleaded this statute as a defense to the allowance of
said claims. The court held that:
"The language of the statute limits the exemption to
,any person to whom an award is made.' It is clear that the
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statute does not extend the exemption beyond the insured and
beneficiary."
The statute as amended by Congress in 1935 was construed by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Ballow vs. First Wisconsin
Trust Company, 270 N. W. 82, in which the court had before it the
identical question as existed in the Pagel case. The Wisconsin court,
in a very well written decision, held that the only question to be considered was:
"Whether the term 'beneficiary under any of the laws
relating to veterans' has so broadened the clause 'person to
whom an award was made' as to include the estate of an insured * * * we think not * * * we failed to discover in the altered language of the Act an intention to repudiate the doctrine of the Pagel case. It seems likely, aside from a purpose
of clarifying the law on the subject of amendments, its principal purpose was to make it clear that payments made under
the Act, either to the insured or designated beneficiary, are
not subject to the claims of creditors either before or after
receipt by either, and thus to set at rest doubts raised by prior
judicial determinations."
There apparently is recognized one exception to the rule as laid
down in the Pagel case. Although it was provided in the amendatory
Act of August 12, 1935, that:
"Section 4747 of Revised Statutes and Section 22 of the
World War Veterans Act, 1924, are hereby repealed, and all
other acts inconsistent herewith are hereby modified accordingly,"
it does not appear that the courts are inclined to construe this proviso as
modifying the protection as extended Adjusted Compensation benefits,
which are commonly referred to as bonus payments. In the Adjusted
Compensation Act of May 19, 1924, it was provided that:
"No sum payable under this Act to a veteran or his dependents, or to his estate, or to any beneficiary named under
Title V, no Adjusted Service Certificate, and no profits of any
loan made on such certificate shall be subject to attachment,
levy or seizure under any legal or equitable process, or to national or state taxation, and no deductions on account of any
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indebtedness of the veteran to the United States shall be made
from the Adjusted Service credit or from any amounts due
under this Act."

In the case of Williams vs. Hiott, 193 S. E. 133, decided by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1937, the court construed this last
quoted protective statute as extending to the heirs of the deceased soldier's estate, into which estate Adjusted Service Certificate benefits had
been paid by the Veterans' Administration for distribution to heirs under the laws of descent and distribution of the state of South Carolina.
In the Pagel case there was a designated beneficiary, who had received payment of monthly installments upon the deceased veteran's
War Risk Insurance policy up to the date of the designated beneficiary's
death, leaving an unpaid balance of insurance moneys. The trial court,
in this case, followed the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Singleton vs. Cheek, 284 U. S. 493, in which it is held
that when the insured dies intestate and the designated beneficiary subsequently dies, the commuted amount of installments not accrued as of the
date of the beneficiary's death, is to be paid to the estate of the insured for
distribution to his heirs, and that the heirs are to be determined as of the
date of the insured's death in accordance with the laws of the state of his
last legal residence.
In conclusion it may be reiterated that, in conducting this program
of supervision over the administration of estates into which Veterans'
Administration benefits are paid for the use of a beneficiary under legal
disability, the responsibility of the Veterans' Administration is the personal and financial welfare of the insane veteran or minor child. The
monetary interest of the United States government in the administration
of these estates, if existent, is very, very remote. There does exist a statute which provides that in the event a beneficiary dies without living
heirs whatsoever, leaving money in one of these estates which has been
derived exclusively from the payment of Veterans' Administration benefits, that the said moneys will escheat to the United States Treasury
rather than to the state of Colorado. To the extent of this very remote
contingency on escheat it might be argued that the United States government has a monetary interest in the conservation of estate funds. During
the past several years this escheat statute has been applied in only two
small Colorado estates.

G. DEXTER BLOUNT Writes About the-

Meeting of House of
Delegates of
American Bar Association
The Midwinter Meeting of the House of Delegates of American
Bar Association was held at the Edgewater Beach Hotel in Chicago,
January 8 and 9, 1940. The meeting of the Board of Governors occurred at the same hotel on January 6 and 7.
The House of Delegates is composed of the Board of Governors of
the association, the State Delegates, the delegates of the State Bar Associations and associations of some of the larger cities, Section Chairmen,
and others. The total membership is approximately 170.
All the Colorado lawyers who are members of the House of Delegates were prseent. They are James A. Woods, State Delegate; Wilbur
F. Denious, Delegate of Colorado Bar Association; Stanley T. Wallbank, Chairman of the National Conference of Bar Examiners; and G.
Dexter Blount, member of the Board of Governors.
During the sessions of the Board of Governors all day Saturday
and Sunday afternoon, the business of the association which had been
transacted since the San Francisco Convention last July, including the
activities of various standing and special committees, was reviewed and
passed upon.
The House of Delegates was in session Monday morning, afternoon
and evening and most of Tuesday. During those sessions reports and
recommendations of the thirteen sections of the association and the numerous standing and special committees were given serious consideration.
Many of the proposals contained in these reports were debated vigorously
and spiritedly. Some were approved. Others were disapproved. The
reports showed earnest activity and a tremendous amount of work done
by the sections and committees in efforts to advance the interests of the
public and the welfare of lawyers. Among the most interesting reports
were those of committees on law lists the bill of rights economic condition of the bar, legal air work, the establishment of legal service bureaus,
the establishment of an appellate court handling patent cases exclusively,
legal publications, bar organization activities, regulation of administrative agencies and junior bar activities.
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It appeared from the report of the Law List Committee that as a
result of the regulatory system which it has set up, the number of law
lists being published has been reduced from about 300 to about 40 and
that thereby approximately $9,000,000 a year has been saved to lawyers
in subscriptions to law lists.
The committees on Legal Aid Work and Legal Service Bureaus are
attempting, quite successfully, to extend throughout the country the opportunities of impecunious people to obtain legal services for which they
are not able to pay, or to pay only small fees.
The main object of the Committee on the Bill of Rights is to assist
people in the establishment of their rights as citizens, guaranteed by the
amendments to the Federal Constitution generally known as the Bill of
Rights. The committee proposes to intervene as amicus curiae in cases in
the United States Supreme Court, principally, in which fundamental
questions of national importance are involved where it appears that people might be deprived of such rights as were guaranteed by Magna Charta
and subsequent statutes down to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The committee also attempts to interest
local lawyers to participate in similar cases which are not of such national
importance.
Efforts are being made as shown by the reports, to decrease the
number and cost of legal publications, to improve the economic condition of lawyers, to extend the work of the Junior Bar, to advance legal
education, and to decrease the confusion in practice before administrative agencies. Space will not permit the further discussion of those
reports.
Jacob M. Lashly of St. Louis, who was a guest at the meeting of the
Colorado Bar Association last September, was nominated for president
of the association, to be elected at the next annual meeting.
The newly nominated members of the Board of Governors are exGovernor John M. Slaton of Atlanta, Georgia; Sylvester Smith, Jr., of
Newark, New Jersey, and Robert F. Maguire of Portland, Oregon, representing the lawyers in their respective Federal Circuits.
Since the meeting in San Francisco the net membership of the association has increased about 500. The total membership is now nearly
35,000.
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COLORADO JUNIOR BAR CONFERENCE PLANS
REGIONAL MEETINGS
Following a successful annual meeting held in the fall at Colorado
Springs the members of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference are enthusiastically engaged in carrying out the conference program.
Under the sponsorship of Mark H. Harrington of Denver, former
State Chairman, Max M. Gilford of Los Angeles, California, an Associate Director of the Public Information Program, came to Denver to further the activity in Colorado in the program. Mr. Gilford conferred
with the State Director, J. Quigg Newton, Jr., of Denver, and with a
number of other active committeemen.
In continuing the policy formulated last year of holding regional
meetings in various parts of the state, Mr. Gilford's visit provided the
occasion for the first of such meetings to be held in Denver. He was the
guest speaker at a luncheon held on December 28 at the Denver Athletic
Club, which was attended by twenty-five Denver members of the conference. The meeting was presided over by Hubert D. Henry, State
Chairman for Colorado. Edward J. Ruff of Denver, Chairman of the
Committee on Meetings, was in charge of the arrangements.
Following Mr. Gilford's address, which dealt not only with the
objects of the public information program but also with the mechanics
for putting the program into operation, plans were discussed for holding
similar meteings in Denver of conference members. Mr. Gilford's visit
to Denver furnished a real impetus to holding further meetings. The
chairman also announced that further regional meetings would be held
in other parts of the state in connection with the legal institutes which
are being planned for this year.

PERSONAL EVENTS FROM FORT COLLINS
Judge Harry H. Hartman spent the holidays with his daughter,
Mrs. Paul R. Bliss, and family at Palo Alto, California. L. R. Temple
spent the Christmas season with his son-in-law and daughter, Mr. and
Mrs. Jack Griffin, at South Orange, N. J. Mr. and Mrs. Arthur E.
March and sons, Arthur, Jr., and Tommy, have just returned from California, where they visited his parents, Mr. and Mrs. C. E. March, at
Long Beach during the holidays. Mr. and Mrs. Fancher Sarchet have
left on a three weeks trip, expecting to go as far south as New Orleans.
-DALE

SHANNON, Correspondent.

FRED E. NEEF Reports the

Current Events of
Bench and Bar
Supreme Court Decisions More Readable
A noticeable characteristic of recent opinions of the United States
Supreme Court is their clarity and readability. This trend is ascribed
to the new lay audience which the court has acquired through recent
decisions on new deal social and economic legislative measures. Many
of these decisions have been printed and circulated by Congress among
laymen as well as lawyers.

Elimination of Part Time Practitioner Advocated
In a recent communication to the Netv York Law Journal a proposal that a substantial annual license fee be exacted of lawyers as a means
of eliminating the "part-time" attorney was advanced. The "part-time"
attorney was defined as ane who handles legal business now and then
while pursuing some other occupation. To eliminate the alleged wrong
the proponent would impose an annual license fee on lawyers of as much
as $400. The fee would come back to the attorney in the form of legal
books, services, and similar items, and in part could be used to inform the
public of the benefits and advantages of employing regular counsel.

Character Examinations for Bar Applicants Criticised
Karl A. McCormick, Proctor of the Bar for the eighth judicial
district, in his third annual report stated that the character examinations
for applicants to the bar are inadequate. This inadequacy, he said, rests
in the failure to examine the applicants until after they have graduated
from law school. If examinations were conducted prior to law school
enrollment, an unfit individual might be diverted to another career; but,
under the present system the committee would not feel justified in denying admission after this individual had expended time, effort, and money
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in the completion of a law course. A similar system has operated effectively in Pennsylvania for several years.

Civil Service for Government Attorneys
The President's Committee on Civil Service, headed by Supreme
Court Justice Stanley F. Reed, will urge the selection of government
attorneys through civil service competitive methods. While civil service
methods will be employed, it is expected that the departmental legal executives will be given authority to conduct most of the examinations. Under the plan all jobs except those filled by presidential appointment
would carry civil service status with its usual privileges.

Schools Should Teach Law of Today
Charles A. Beardsley, President of the A. B. A., told a group of
law school deans and professors recently: "You are training the lawyers
of tomorrow, and they should receive more training in the law that has
been made since the steering-wheel became the family circle." He alleged
that the law schools are teaching the same law that was taught a generation ago; namely, the common law, which has been largely supplanted
by statute law. Beardsley pointed out that legal problems of tomorrow
cannot be answered from the law of yesterday.

Cadavers for Lawyers
The University of Southern California is offering a new medical
course for lawyers which calls for the use of cadavers rather than simply
charts and text books. The theory of the course is to give lawyers a
more realistic understanding of the medical issues involved in personal
injury cases.

Statistics on Neighborhood Law Offices
Of the clients which visited the new neighborhood law offices in
Philadelphia during their first month of operation, over 7.7 per cent had
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never before consulted a lawyer for any purpose, it was recently announced. The announcement was regarded as significant in view of the
criticism that the neighborhood offices were drawing business away from
other lawyers. Other statistics disclosed were that 21% of the applicants
were unemployed and that the remainder included skilled and ordinary
laborers, farmers, clerical workers, salesmen, and domestics.

FRANK McDONOUGH, SR., FORMER DISTRICT
JUDGE, IS DEAD
Frank McDonough, Sr., former district judge, died at his home in
Denver on January 10, 1940, after an illness of two months.
Judge McDonough and his wife came to Denver in 1891 from his
birthplace in Brooklyn, N. Y. He attended the University of Denver
Law School, from which he graduated in 1896. He opened an office for
the practice of law in Denver soon after his admittance to the bar.
In 1927 he was appointed to fill an unexpired term on the Denver
District Court bench. He was elected to that position in 1928 and
remained on the bench until 1936.
Governor Teller Ammons appointed him a member of the Civil
Service Commission in August, 1937, and he served there until his resignation on December 31, 1938.
During his 76 years of life, Judge McDonough served as president
of the Colorado Sons of the Revolution, as trustee of Denver University,
and a member of the athletic council, and as vice-president and a director
of the University of Denver Stadium, Inc. He was active in church affairs, having been a trustee of the Trinity Methodist Church, vice-president and director of the Y. M. C. A., and an officer in the Church Extension Society.
At one time he served as board chairman and director of the North
Side Community Center. He was a member of the Masonic order, a
Shriner, and past commander of the Knights Templar.
In addition to his wife, he is survived by four sons, Frank, Jr., Gilbert, Roger, and John, all of Denver, and two daughters, Grace E. McDonough of Grand Junction, and Mrs. Knight C. Porter of Gleneve, Ill.
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SHAFROTH NEW HEAD IN ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF FEDERAL COURTS
Will Shafroth, ambassador of good will for the legal profession,
was appointed Chief of the Procedural Studies and Statistics in the administrative office of the United States courts, according to advice received by DICTA. The exact nature of Mr. Shafroth's work is unknown
at the present time, but it is expected that he will be doing considerable
field work in connection wiih superintending dockets of the federal
courts.
Mr. Shafroth has been engaged almost entirely in legal organization
work since 1934, when he left his practice in Denver to become director
of the National Bar Program of the American Bar Association. Since
that time he has served as adviser to the council of legal education of the
American Bar Association and secretary of the National Conference of
Bar Examiners.

LONG ILLNESS OF HUGO SELIG, PIONEER
LAWYER, RESULTS IN DEATH
Hugo Selig, prominent pioneer lawyer of Montrose, died at his
home in Montrose January 19, 1940. Death came after a protracted
illness which forced him to abandon active practice.
Coming to Montrose in 1884 from Ohio where for a short time
he was a school teacher and deputy clerk of court, Mr. Selig was admitted
to the Colorado bar in that year; and quickly entered into the community
life of the town. He served as deputy district attorney under John Gray
for an eight-year term beginning in 1890. In 1905, Mr. Selig was
elected district attorney.
He formed partnerships with some of the outstanding lawyers of
the district during his years of practice. He was a charter member of the
Elks, and was a member of the Knights of Pythias.
In 1905 he married Miss Le Vonne N. Morris. Besides his widow
he is survived by two daughters, two granddaughters, a son, and three
brothers.
Last fall Mr. Selig completed his autobiography, "Early Recollections," which was published in the Montrose Daily Press. In addition
to personal matters, the biography tells many interesting stories of the
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practice of law in a small western community during the last sixty years.
A memorial to Mr. Selig was presented to the District Court at Montrose
by John L. Stivers in behalf of the Montrose County Bar Association,
and ordered spread upon the records of the court on January 22nd.

LAW LISTS APPROVED
The Special Committee on Law Lists of the American Bar Association has announced the law lists which have been approved as to
1940 editions. Under Canon 43, it is unethical for a lawyer to permit
his name to be published in a list which has not been approved. The
committee states that it will do all in its power to see that the canon
is enforced. The approved list follows.
AMERICAN BANK ATTORNEYS.
THE AMERICAN BAR
AMERICAN INSURANCE LAWYERS AssoCIATION.
AMERICAN LAWYERS ANNUAL.
AMERICAN LAWYERS QUARTERLY.
A. C. A. LIST.
ATTORNEYS LIST (U. S. F. I& G.).
THE B. A. LAW LIST.
BANKERS LAW REGISTER.
THE BAR REGISTER.
BEST'S RECOMMENDED INSURANCE ATTORNEYS.

MARTINDALE-HUBBELL
LAW DIRECTORY.
THE MERCANTILE ADJUSTER.
THE NATIONAL LIST.
RAND MCNALLY LIST OF BANK RECOMMENDFD ATTORNEYS.
RUSSELL LAW LIST.
SULLIVAN'S LAW DIRECTORY.
THE UNITED LAW LIST.
WILBER DIRECTORY OF ATTORNEYS
AND BANKS.
WRIGHT-HOLMES LAW LIST.
ZONE LAW LIST.

CAMPBELL'S LIST.
CLEARING HOUSE QUARTERLY.
THE COLUMBIA LIST.
THE COMMERCIAL BAR.
CORPORATION LAWYERS DIRECTORY.
THE C-R-C ATTORNEY DIRECTORY.
FORWARDERS LIST OF ATTORNEYS.
THE HAYTHE GUIDE.
HINE'S INSURANCE COUNSEL.
THE INSURANCE BAR.
INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS LAW LIST.
THE LAWYERS DIRECTORY.
THE LAWYERS LIST.

(U. S. A. Sections)
CANADA BONDED ATTORNEY.
CANADA LEGAL DIRECTORY.
CANADIAN LAW LIST.
EMPIRE LAW LIST.
INTERNATIONAL LAW LIST.
KIME'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DIRECTORY.
THE LAW LIST.
THE SCOTTISH LAW DIRECTORY.
THE SCOTTISH LAW LIST.

FOREIGN LISTS

The members of the Committee are Stanley B. Houck, Chairman,
Henry S. Ballard, George E. Brand, Earle W. Evans and Cassius E.
Gates. Anycne desiring to communicate with the Committee with regard to matters affecting law lists, will kindly address the Secretary, Mr.
Martin J. Teigan, 209 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois.
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FIRST JUDICIAL BAR ASSOCIATION HEARS
CONFESSIONS OF HORACE N. HAWKINS
Horace N. Hawkins, erstwhile resident of Denver and now a citizen
of Jefferson County, was the principal speaker at the meeting of the First
Judicial Bar Association held at the Edelweiss Cafe on January 19, 1940.
Mr. Hawkins reminisced on his experiences, "After Fifty Years at the
Bar." His delightful talk on his adventures in the law was preceded by
the remarks of Judge Samuel A. Johnson of Arvada, who presented Mr.
Hawkins to the group. Judge Johnson exhibited a program of the 4th
Annual Banquet of the Denver Bar Association and a Red Book Guide
to Denver, the possession of which he was unable to explain.
Judge Osmer E. Smith of Golden presided at the meeting and surrendered his gavel at the close to the newly elected president, Judge Homer
G. Preston of Aurora. Judge Henry B. Teller of Littleton was selected
vice-president and David W. Sarvas of Brighton as secretary-treasurer.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Hawkins was made an honorary member of the association. More than forty members of the association were present and in addition several county judges from other
districts who were in town attending the County Judges meeting.

MESA BAR ADOPTS MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE AND
ESTABLISHES LIBRARY FUND
The Mesa County Bar Association held a dinner meeting on December 22, 1939, at the LaCourt Hotel in Grand Junction. James K.
Groves of Grand Junction was elected president of the association for
the coming year, and Eugene H. Mast of Grand Junction was re-elected
secretary.
John P. Helman of Grand Junction made a report for the minimum
fee committee. The schedule of fees adopted is to be distributed among
the members of the association in printed form.
Upon motion, it was voted that a library fund be established for
the Mesa County Bar Association and that all members of the association be placed upon a list and that they be appointed in rotation
as guardians ad litem and attorneys for indigent defendants in criminal
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cases, as nearly as possible and within the discretion of the court. The
fees received from such appointments are to be paid into the library fund.
-JOHN

C. BANKS, Correspondent.

PERSONALS FROM GRAND JUNCTION
Hon. Straud M. Logan, judge of the District Court of the 7th
Judicial District, was married to Miss Fannie Morris on December 18,
1939.
Thomas K. Younge, who has been associated with the firm of
Tupper, Smith and Holmes for the past year, is now associated with the
firm of McMullin, Sternberg & Helman.
Loring W. Jordan, who practiced law in Grand Junction from
1917 to 1926, but has recently been located in Oregon, has now returned to Grand Junction, and opened an office for the practice of law
-- JOHN C. BANKS, Correspondent.
in the Electric Building.

LEGAL CHATTER
Legal Chatter Publications, Candler Building, Baltimore, Md., will
without obligation mail copies of Legal Chatter to all DICTA readers who
might be interested in receiving them.

DUES!

DUES!

DUES!

DUES!

DUES!

The Secretary's office hereby announces that dues are due and past
due. Please take notice and bring your account up to date immediately.

Joseph Epstein
BEST WISHES

To the Bar Association

W. S.
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